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I. INTRODUCTIONS ECTION 336 of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA Modernization
Act) exempts model aircraft from future FAA rulemaking.' In
an attempt to clarify this exception, on June 25, 2014, the FAA
released a proposed interpretation of the definition of model
aircraft that set more narrow limits on the exemption. 2 This pro-
posed interpretation outraged the model aircraft community,
and in response, multiple petitions were filed with the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals to nullify the FAA's proposed inter-
pretation.' In evaluating this ongoing debate, this article will use
two competing theories of jurisprudence-Richard Posner's
pragmatism and Ronald Dworkin's constructivism-to examine
whether the FAA's purpose of maintaining air safety is best
achieved by a narrow definition of the model aircraft exemption
that more heavily regulates the model aircraft industry or a
broader exemption that allows the model aircraft industry to
continue to innovate.
In Part II, the background and facts surrounding the pro-
posed interpretation of the model aircraft exception are ex-
plained. In Part III, Posner's pragmatism theory is explained,
along with his views on rules compared to standards. Then Pos-
ner's pragmatic view is applied to the situation at hand. In Part
IV, a similar task is performed using Ronald Dworkin's construc-
tivism theory. Then in Part V, the two theories are compared to
evaluate which theory would be preferred for the best intended
effect on the model aircraft industry.
II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
A model aircraft is considered a type of unmanned aerial sys-
tem (UAS), and Congress has chosen to distinguish model air-
craft from its planned regulation of small UAS by a definition
that exempts model aircraft.4 More than twenty years after the
Wright brothers invented the airplane, Congress passed the first
airplane safety regulation in 1926 due to a growing number of
I FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336, 126
Stat. 11.
2 FAA Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 14 C.F.R. Part 91,
11 (proposed June 23, 2014) [hereinafter FAA Interpretation].
3 See Petitioners Seek to Ground FAA's Model Aircraft Directive, 32 No. 15 WESTLAWJ.
AvIATION 3 (2014).
4 See David F. Carr, FAA Rules on Drones vs. Model Aircraft Contested, EE TIMES
(July 28, 2014), http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?docid=1323255.
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airplane accidents and the commercialization of the airline in-
dustry.5 After many attempts over the next several decades at
creating a successful air safety agency, the FAA was established
in 1958 to protect the general public and the growing and inno-
vative airline industry from large-scale disasters, such as the
Grand Canyon Disaster.6 Historically, the FAA has excluded
model aircraft from FAA regulation. At most, in 1981, the FAA
encouraged "voluntary compliance" by model aircraft with FAA
safety standards,7 and in 2007, the FAA released a non-binding
statement to the public introducing a policy that a special air-
worthiness certificate was required to operate model aircraft op-
erated for compensation or in a national park.8 While the
amount of "close calls" with airplanes has increased, there have
yet to be any accidents of model aircraft with conventional
airplanes.9
A. THE FAA MODERNIZATION ACT
The FAA Modernization Act was promulgated to update the
United States' airspace regulation to match the improvements
in technology and globalization.1 ° As part of the FAA Moderni-
zation Act, Congress required the FAA to develop a plan for
safely integrating civil unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into
the national airspace, while still maintaining the safety of the
national airspace.1' Moreover, the FAA was required to issue a
rule that permitted the use of small UAS in the national air-
See Origins of the FAA, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/about/history/
briefhistory/ [hereinafter FAA Origins].
6 See id. One hundred twenty-eight people died in a collision between two com-
mercial airlines at 21,000 feet over the Grand Canyon (the Grand Canyon Disas-
ter). See id. The Grand Canyon Disaster occurred in 1956, and the FAA was
established by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. See id.
7 See Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217, 2014 WL 3388631, at *2 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6,
2014).
8 See id. at *3.
9 Barbara E. Lichman, FAA Reports Increasing Conflict Between Drones and Civil
Aviation, AVIATION & AIRPORT DEv. LAW NEWS (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.avia-
tionairportdevelopmentlaw.com/tags/pirker-v-huerta/; see Joan Lowry, Lawsuits
Challenge FAA Ban on Commercial Drone Flights, PBS NEwsHOUR (Aug. 22, 2014,
4:33 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/lawsuits-challenge-faas-ban-
commercial-drone-flights/.
10 See Respondent's Reply Brief, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Nov.
17, 2014), http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Documents/Respondent'sReplyBrief
.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Pirker Brief].
11 See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332,
126 Stat. 11; see also FAA Makes Progress with UAS Integration, FAA, https://www.faa
.gov/news/updates/?newsld=68004 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (stating "The
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space. 2 As the FAA begins the integration plan, the public be-
lieves that first rulings are predictions of how the FAA will
intend to integrate UAS as a whole in the national airspace sys-
tem.' 3 Thus, this proposed interpretation by the FAA is contro-
versial because it establishes a precedent of how the FAA will
regulate UAS, and with the narrow interpretation of the special
rule, more of the model aircraft industry would be subject to the
small UAS integration plan."4
The FAA Modernization Act defines a model aircraft as "an
unmanned aircraft ... (1) capable of sustained flight in the at-
mosphere; (2) flown within visual line of sight of the person op-
erating the aircraft; and (3) flown for hobby or recreational
purposes."15 Moreover, Section 336 of the Modernization Act
lists five requirements to determine if a model aircraft is exempt
from future FAA regulation:
(1) The aircraft is flown strictly for hobby or recreational use;
(2) The aircraft is operated in accordance with a community-
based set of safety guidelines and within the programming of a
nationwide community-based organization;
(3) The aircraft is limited to not more than 55 pounds unless
otherwise certified through a design, construction, inspection,
flight test, and operational safety program administered by a
community-based organization;
(4) The aircraft is operated in a manner that does not interfere
with or gives way to any manned aircraft; and
(5) When flown within 5 miles of an airport, the operator of the
aircraft provides the airport operator and the airport air traffic
control tower ... with prior notice of the operation. 6
In the fall 2013, the FAA fined an individual $10,000 for flying
a model over the University of Virginia's campus to film a pro-
motional video.' v In March 2014, a National Transportation and
Safety Board (NTSB) judge ruled that the FAA's fine was not
FAA's sole mission and authority as it focuses on the integration of unmanned
aircraft systems is safety.").
12 See Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *4.
13 See Timothy J. Lynes, FAA Issues Proposed Interpretation of Model Aircraft, LEX-
OLOGY (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0c3c08
7b-6cc5-4e34-87b3-97c 15035462e.
14 See Carr, supra note 4.
15 FAA Interpretation, supra note 2, app. A at A-1.
16 Id.
17 Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *6.
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under its authority and that no precedent or rule justified the
FAA's fine.18 Subsequently, the FAA appealed the ruling."
B. THE FAA's INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL
AIRCRAFT EXCEPTION
Seemingly tied to the NTSB judge's ruling in Huerta v. Pirker,
the FAA issued a proposed interpretation of the five require-
ments for exemption of model aircraft in Section 336 of the
FAA Modernization Act.20 The FAA stated six interpretations for
the definition of model aircraft, but only three are worth noting
since they were the most controversial.2 1 First, the FAA inter-
preted the requirement for "flown within the visual line of sight"
of the operator as:
(1) The aircraft must be visible at all times to the operator; (2)
that the operator must use his or her own natural vision (which
includes vision corrected by standard eyeglasses or contact
lenses) to observe the aircraft; and (3) people other than the
operator may not be used in lieu of the operator for maintaining
visual line of sight.2
2
This interpretation prohibits the use of goggles that view the
flight of the aircraft from an onboard camera, and operators are
required to have an "unobstructed view of the aircraft. ' 23 More-
over, the operator must be able to personally view the aircraft
and cannot rely upon another person to see the aircraft.24
Second, the FAA interpreted the third prong of the model
aircraft definition to mean "strictly for hobby or recreational pur-
poses. '25 For example, the FAA said that a person may use a
model aircraft to take photographs for their personal use, but if
any of the photographs are sold or used in a business, then the
operator is not exempt from future FAA regulation. 6 Moreover,
a farmer is allowed to fly a model aircraft to examine a field of
crops if the crops are grown for personal use, but is prohibited
18 See id. at *5.
19 See Huerta v. Pirker, No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 17,
2014).
20 See Lynes, supra note 13.
21 See FAA Interpretation, supra note 2.
22 Id. app. B at B-8.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. (emphasis added).
26 Id. app. B at B-10.
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from doing so if the crops are grown for commercial purposes.27
The distinction appears to be based on whether the operator
receives a fee in any way for flying the model aircraft.2 8
Regarding Congress's third requirement, the FAA interpreted
the requirement of "55 pounds or less" to mean the weight of
the aircraft at the time of takeoff.29 The FAA stated that the take-
off weight includes the weight of the body of the aircraft along
with any fuel or loaded equipment.30 In stating its reasoning, the
FAA felt that this requirement was to allow only small model
aircraft to fly without FAA regulation and that allowing a seem-
ingly unlimited amount of equipment being added to a model
aircraft that weighs 55 pounds would contradict Congress's in-
tent behind the rule.3 1
C. PUBLIC REACTION TO THE FAA's INTERPRETATION
After releasing the proposed interpretation, the FAA allowed
comments on the interpretation of the model rule. As shown
from the comments, the model aircraft community, researchers,
media, and businesses were outraged.3 2 For example, the Infor-
mation Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) filed a
ten-page response stating that the FAA interpretation would se-
verely limit a growing innovation and experimentation opportu-
nity, and the narrow interpretation would also subject the
industry to unnecessary regulation, particularly since only two
deaths had been caused by model aircraft in the past few de-
cades.3 3 Another comment, written by two fellows from the Mer-
catus Center at George Mason University, argued that the FAA's
interpretation would harm innovative ideas, such as Amazon's
and Google's respective plans for using UAS as means for deliv-
27 Id.
28 See id. (noting also that the model aircraft can transport a package without
compensation, but is prohibited if the operator receives a fee for delivering the
package).
29 Id. app. B at B-11.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See Jeff Roberts, FAA's Drone Restrictions Lead to New Lawsuits from Universities
and Business Groups, GIGAOM (Aug. 25, 2014, 7:16 AM), https://gigaom.com/
2014/08/25/faas-drone-restrictions-lead-to-new-lawsuits-from-universities-and-
business-groups/.
33 See Letter from Robert D. Atkinson et al., President and Founder, Informa-
tion Technology and Innovation Foundation, to Dean E. Griffith, Office of Chief
Counsel-Regulations Division, FAA (July 24, 2014), http://www2.itif.org/2014-
faa-comments.pdf. The ITIF is a renowned technology think tank funded by large
IT corporations, such as Google and Cisco. See Carr, supra note 4.
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ering packages.34 Moreover, the comment speculated about the
safety that could have resulted from UAS being used during the
riots in Ferguson, Missouri, which would be a use prohibited by
the FAA's interpretation." Additionally, hobbyists organiza-
tions, such as the Remote Control Aerial Platform Association
(RCAPA), filed comments opposing the interpretation because
the strict definition of recreation eliminates any competitions or
paid gatherings between hobbyists, and there is no evidence of
unsafe model aircraft practices that warrant regulation. 36 The
RCAPA also believes that the model aircraft community is best
suited to regulate itself because the proposed ban on First-Per-
son View (FPV) is unnecessary in light of the current industry
standard to have another person with controls personally view-
ing the aircraft, in addition to the main pilot for the UAS.37
Since the comments have been filed, a few events in the
model aircraft community have unfolded. On the pro-regula-
tion side, the National Parks System now prohibits the flight of
civil UAS in national parks." This regulation came amidst sev-
eral model aircraft crashing in national parks, such as the model
aircraft that crashed into a hot spring in Yellowstone National
Park in August 2014."0 On the anti-regulation side, the FAA al-
lowed the use of UAS in movie production for certain film com-
panies.4 Both regulations do not show a clear consensus on the
issue of regulating model aircraft and continue to show that the
issue is not yet settled.
34 Public Interest Comment, Ryan Hagemann & Adam Thierer, FAA Interpre-
tation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, MERCATUS CENTER 2 (Sept. 23,
2014), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Thierer-FAA-modelairplane-PIC
.pdf; see also Vindu Goel, A New Facebook Lab is Intent on Delivering Internet Access by
Drone, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/
03/04/now-facebook-has-a-drone-plan/?_r=0 (noting that Facebook intends on
using UAS to broadcast wireless internet in any space).
35 See Hagemnann & Thierer, supra note 34, at 6.
36 RCAPA Rebuttal to the FAA's Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model
Aircraft, REMOTE CONTROL AERIAL PLATFORM Assoc., http://rcapa.net/rebuttal-
to-the-faas-interpretation/.
37 See id.
38 See Trevor Hughes, Man Charged after Drone Crashes into Yellowstone Lake, USA
TODAY (Sept. 3, 2015, 8:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/09/03/charges-brought-in-drone-crashes/ 15041623/.
39 See id.
- Press Release, FAA, U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx Announces FAA Ex-
emptions for Commercial UAS Movie and TV Production (Sept. 25, 2014), http:/
/www.faa.gov/news/press-releases/news-story.cfm?cid=TW251 &newsId=1 7194.
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D. CLAIMS FILED BY MEMBERS OF THE MODEL
AIRCRAFT COMMUNITY
During the midst of the comment period, three separate ap-
peals were petitioned to the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals to review and nullify the FAA's proposed interpretation of
the model aircraft exception. 41 After the petitions were filed, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals consolidated all three pe-
titions into one case, UAS v. Huerta.4 2 This article is about the
broad concept of whether the FAA should regulate the model
aircraft industry, and not this specific case. But the claims filed
in these petitions are helpful in understanding the public out-
rage regarding the FAA's proposed interpretation of the special
rule for model aircraft.
One appeal was filed by a group of research universities, the
Council on Governmental Relations (COGR), because the pro-
posed interpretation prohibited using model aircraft for re-
search purposes.4" In its petition, the COGR argued that the
proposed interpretation "poses a grave threat to science, re-
search, education, and technological innovation across the
United States by purporting to regulate, restrict, or even com-
pletely prohibit, use of model aircraft technology by universities,
colleges, and research institutions, their faculty, and their
students."44
Another appeal, by the Academy of Model Aeronautics
(AMA), focused on the proposed interpretation's inconsistency
with past precedent. 45 In the AMA's eyes, not only has Congress
said it would exempt model aircraft in the FAA Modernization
Act, but the FAA has never imposed regulations on model air-
craft during its 100-year history.4 6 Moreover, the AMA sees vast
safety problems created by the strict requirement for no com-
mercial benefit because activities that promote safety would be
prohibited, such as paid lessons for learning how to fly model
aircraft.47
41 See Petitioners Seek to Ground FAA's Model Aircraft Directive, supra note 3.
42 See id.
43 See Council on Government Relations v. FAA, petition for review, No. 14-1157,
2014 WL 4407996, at *2 (C.A.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).
44 See id.
45 See Petition for Review, Acad. of Model Aeronautics v. FAA, No. 14-1158,
2014 WL 4407997, at *3-4 (C.A.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).
46 See id. at *3.
47 See id. at *4-5.
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Lastly, the third appeal was from a group of businesses, the
UAS Fund, Skypan, Sachs, and FPV Manuals, who are now sub-
ject to the FAA's regulations for operating their commercial
model aircraft businesses.4 8 The UAS Fund finances the emerg-
ing commercial UAS industry.49 The proposed rulemaking pur-
ports to "greatly restrict or outright prohibit the operation,
research, development, and testing of UAS. ' '50 This ability to
"freely research, develop, test, and deploy UAS ... is crucial to
the financial success of the UAS Fund. This Order disrupts the
ability of the UAS Fund to invest in American companies. "51
SkyPan is a business of aerial photography using radio-control
model helicopters, specifically photography of buildings for real
estate and construction projects.52 These pictures are used to
"fund, design, and market residential and office towers nation-
wide. ' ' 53 Its commercial photography business would be com-
pletely prohibited by the proposed rulemaking. 54 Sachs has
operated model aircraft for commercial and non-hobbyist pur-
poses, such as using a model aircraft to assist a fire department
in assessing a quarry fire, which "saved fire department re-
sources, improved public safety .... and prevented the injury or
death of fire fighters. ' 55 FPV Manuals operates as an online re-
tailer focusing on sales of model aircraft.56 Customers have can-
celed orders for FPV aircraft, which are rendered illegal by the
proposed rulemaking.57 Moreover, FPV Manuals is prohibited
from test-flying the model aircraft before selling the product,
which was previously used as a means of product control.5 8 Addi-
tionally, FPV Manuals cannot use their model aircraft products
to film advertising or marketing projects to promote their
business. 59
48 See Petition for Review, UAS America Fund v. FAA, No. 14-1156, 2014 WL
4407995 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 2014).
49 See id. at *2.
50 Id.
51 Id.




56 Id. at *4.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id. at *5.
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III. POSNER'S PRAGMATISM
Richard Posner is the leader in incorporating economic prin-
ciples intojudicial decision making, a theory defined as pragma-
tism. As a descendent of realism,60 pragmatism has three main
principles: (1) distrust for Kantian metaphysical principles, such
as "truth" and "fairness," which have no clear definition; (2) test-
ingjudicial decisions by their consequences and differences pro-
duced; and (3) comparing whether judicial decisions meet
social needs, rather than if they meet metaphysical principles,
such as "fundamental rights" and "liberty."61 As a guide in eco-
nomical judicial decision-making, pragmatism weighs the conse-
quences of the judicial decision using a cost/benefit analysis to
find the decision that brings the most "wealth maximization" for
society.6 2 Moreover, following the distrust for metaphysical
ideas, pragmatists also do not feel obligated to follow precedent
and do feel compelled to act contrary to past decisions if it is
best for society.63 The pragmatist feels that following precedent
without considering social consequences can result in hurting
society. 64 Thus, the decision from' a pragmatic perspective is
strongly dependent on the facts of a case. Before looking at the
economics of the case at hand, Richard Posner's views on ad-
ministrative regulation versus common law standards will be dis-
cussed to provide a direction for how a judge would view the
economics of this decision.
A. POSNER'S VIEWS ON RULES VERSUS STANDARDS
In Regulation (Agencies) versus Litigation (Courts), Richard Pos-
ner examined the economic efficiency of controlling society via
60 Oliver Wendell Holmes was considered the father of legal realism, with his
article, The Path of Law. In that article, he wrote that."[f]or the rational study of
law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." Oliver W. Holmes,
Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
61 Edward Cantu, Posner's Pragmatism and the Turn Toward Fidelity, 16 LEwis &
CLARK L. REv. 69, 77 (2012).
62 See id. at 76.
63 See id. at 77-78. This has roots in the view Holmes presents in The Path of
Law, in which he disagrees with "the notion that the only force at work in the
development of the law is logic." According to Holmes, "judges have a duty of
weighing considerations of social advantage." See Holmes, supra note 60, at 467.
64 See Cantu, supra note 61, at 77-78.
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judicial decisions or through regulatory rules.65 Since Posner's
jurisprudence is simply an economic analysis of law, describing
his views in this article is helpful to show the pros and cons of
regulating through legislative and administrative rules as op-
posed to letting innovation and the common law regulate the
safety of an industry. According to Posner, the goal of both the
courts and agencies is "to solve economic problems that cannot
be left to the market to solve."6 6 In the case regarding model
aircraft, if the FAA does not regulate, the alternatives would
likely be the court system or the model aircraft community.
1. Administrative Regulation
Looking to administrative regulation, Posner provides a de-
tailed analysis of the costs and.benefits of administrative regula-
tion." First, Posner views administrative regulation as a
preventive measure for control that is determined before an in-
jury takes place.68 In that regard, there are many positive aspects
of administrative regulation. If rules are explained at the outset,
society has better clarity about how to perform and the legal
obligations towards the activity being regulated.69 If society has
clarity over legal obligations before acting, there likely will be
better compliance with the regulation than if society was uncer-
tain about its responsibility. v0 Moreover, litigation costs after cre-
ating the regulation may be low if the regulation is definite and
carries strict penalties, which could prevent people from break-
ing the rule.71 Thus, administrative regulations are "attractive
when the alternative would be vague standards, resulting in fre-
quent actual or arguable violations and hence frequent enforce-
ment proceedings. '7 2 To create an effective rule, drafters have
the advantage of being able to draw on experts in the particular
field to create a specialized rule that takes into account unique
areas of an activity. 3 Lastly, administrative regulation is not bur-
dened by precedent and thus, can make decisions for social
65 See Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) versus Litigation (Courts): An Ana-
lytical Framework 12, in REGUlATION VS. LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS
AND LAw (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010).
66 Id.




71 See id. at 14.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 19.
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needs without ignoring an obligation to follow existing
authority.74
However, the positive aspects of administrative regulation also
result in weaknesses. Posner notes that a significant disadvan-
tage is that administrative regulations can "exclude from consid-
eration factors the significance of which was not realized when a
rule was promulgated. '7 5 Administrative regulations by them-
selves are static and are probably not broad enough to predict
every circumstance for each case.76 Administrative regulations
run the risk of not being able to cover activities that the drafters
did not expect when creating the rule or that the drafters chose
to omit to keep the regulation clear and definite.77 A rule may
additionally omit an activity because of substantial interest
group pressure, which is not present in a judicial decision. 78
Moreover, instituting a rule to create a definite and clear regula-
tion with strict penalties that effectively prevent society from vio-
lating a rule has heavy fixed costs in the initial design. 79 When
drafting an effective rule, experts in the specific field tend to be
used and considerable time must be used to draft a rule that will
effectively prevent certain conduct. 80 While costs may be low af-
ter the regulation is released, large costs to create an effective
rule cannot be avoided.8" Subsequently, Posner notes that ad-
ministrative regulation can be a requirement for a license or
permit, such as requiring a building permit, rather than a prohi-
bition of an activity.82 If a license is required, costs after the reg-
ulation could be high because obtaining the license may have
high costs, and bribery or other unethical practices may arise if
the license is hard to obtain.8 3
2. Common Law Standards
Looking to common law standards, Posner analyzes the costs
and benefits of using litigation and standards developed by
courts as a post-event means of deterring harm. The rule's big
74 See id. at 18.
75 Id. As will be discussed later, Dworkin considers this to be a violation of
fundamental rights. See discussion infra Part IV.
76 See id. at 14.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 19.
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disadvantage is conversely the standard's big advantage, which is
the ability to incorporate case-specific information.84 This cre-
ates an information advantage over rules, which can be com-
bined with the adversary process. 85 Since the case-specific
information is weighed by judges or ajury in a lawsuit, the infor-
mation is treated more carefully to ensure the best decision is
reached in the case. 86 Therefore, combining the information ad-
vantage with the adversarial process creates flexible standards,
which allow for increased accuracy in achieving the desired
goal. 7 Moreover, there is a possibility of a few cases being filed
on the subject, and the court can make a small number of rul-
ings on the subject to show the public what the regulation is.88
While there may be costs of compliance with a judge-made rule,
the overall costs in creating the rule would be low, and regula-
tion costs would only be incurred after harm, if any, has actually
occurred.89 Furthermore, the person who makes the standard is
also the one who applies the standard, which eliminates the
costs that would be associated with interpreting legislation.9"
This also increases the accuracy of applying standards because
the minds behind creating the standard are also applying it.9
As with rules, standards' advantages also create distinct disad-
vantages. While standards' information advantage is beneficial,
it also imposes high costs per lawsuit because a high amount of
information is produced for each specific case.9 2 On the con-
trary, with a rule similar to a speed limit, for example, a police
officer only has to give out a ticket each time for enforcement,
which creates a low cost of enforcement. 93 Thus, while the fre-
quency of regulating standards may be low, the costs of each of
those events is very high, and additionally, there is no guarantee
that the events will be low in number, which would severely in-
crease costs if there were many lawsuits. 94 Moreover, all of these
factors can create uncertainty, and the ability to be judged in an
adversarial proceeding can create "more variance in out-
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come."9 While the decision can be tied specifically to the facts
of each case, the reliance on a standard can result in the public
not knowing exactly how the facts will be applied to their case,
which can result in people being unintentionally liable.96 Along
with uncertainty and variance, there may be issues in proving
the harm caused, and people may be free from liability due to
technical errors in the trial process.9 7 This uncertainty also re-
sults in difficulty monitoring whether a judge is correct in the
decision making, since it may be expected that results will dif-
fer 98 Likewise, while the appliers of the standards are ad-
vantaged as generalists, the judges also have "limited
investigatory resources, antiquated procedures, commitment to
incremental rulemaking, and delay in responding to serious so-
cial problems."99 Furthermore, there are established methods,
such as limited liability entities and liability insurance, that may
lessen the deterrence of a damages verdict and create a moral
hazard of committing the harm.1"' And there is uncertainty if a
party will receive all of their damages owed, such as when a deci-
sion exceeds the limits of an individual's personal liability insur-
ance policy. 1 ' Finally, large-scale disasters, such as the Great
Recession of 2008, showcase the standard's inability to measure
damages and completely deter after-the-fact. 10 2 As Posner states,
" [i] t is quite impossible to see how [standards] could protect the
economy from the macro-economic consequences of an unregu-
lated business cycle.' 10 3
B. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE
In this case, a judge taking Posner's view would reason
through the cost and benefits of the FAA's interpretation on the
definition of model aircraft. As stated above, there would be a
disregard for past precedent and a concern for the prospective
view of the -ruling's social consequences.10 4 Additionally, the





- Id. at 20.




1-4 See Cantu, supra note 61, at 77-78.
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wealth maximization for society.1"5 Since the economic analysis
uses a prospective view, the heavy fixed costs already incurred in
creating the FAA's interpretation are considered sunk costs and
are not a part of the analysis. 106 However, model aircraft do not
fit many of the FAA's current regulations, which requires more
regulations to be passed that apply to model aircraft.107
1. Benefits of the FAA's Interpretation
In regards to the benefits of the FAA's interpretation, many of
the principles from Posner's article will apply here. First, uncer-
tainty in rule application is low.108 Under the FAA's interpreta-
tion, operators of model aircraft can know with certainty
whether they are operating an aircraft under FAA regulation.
Since there is certainty in compliance with the definition, then
compliance with the rule will arguably be better."0 9 Moreover,
costs in the law's application will be low as the case will likely not
be taken to court to determine if the UAS meets the model air-
craft definition. Such as in the case of Huerta v. Pirker, the FAA
can simply issue a fine if an operator illegally flies a UAS that
fails to meet the exception for model aircraft." 0 However, as in
Huerta, the operator may appeal the fine, which would increase
the costs associated with the FAA's interpretation." 1
Furthermore, the FAA's interpretation subjects many UAS to
FAA regulation, which increases the public safety by not al-
lowing many aircraft to fly, but on the other hand, does not al-
low for safety prevention through market competition. The
administrative rules can be used as an effective means of
preventing large-scale harm and can clearly explain how to
avoid harm." 2 The ability to regulate at the outset can likely pre-
vent harm from occurring, whereas harm would need to be in-
curred to establish ajudicial standard to govern the conduct. An
example of regulating at the outset is the FAA's requirement for
105 See id.
106 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (9th ed; 2009) (defining the term sunk
cost as " [a] cost that has already been incurred and that cannot be recovered").
107 See Pirker Brief, supra note 10, at 18 (noting that under FAA regulation, the
"minimum safe altitude for an 'aircraft' is 500 feet," which is a significantly higher
altitude than most model aircraft can fly) (emphasis omitted).
108 See Posner, supra note 65, at 13.
I- See id.
110 See Huerta v. Pirker, CP-217, 2014 WL 3388631 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6, 2014).
111 See id.
112 Cf Posner, supra note 65, at 19 (noting that standards could not have been
used to prevent large scale disasters such as the Great Recession).
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a Special Airworthiness Certificate for the model aircraft and a
flying certificate for the aircraft's operators. 13 By requiring spe-
cial flight certificates for both the aircraft and operator, the FAA
can prevent unsafe aircraft and inexperienced operators from
flying and injuring the public.
Additionally, if fines are not issued by the FAA, insurance be-
comes the cost that covers damages for harm caused by model
aircraft.'14 The risks associated with model aircraft are largely
unknown today because not many injuries have occurred yet,
with only two deaths in the history of model aircraft.1 5 There-
fore, insurance providers will have a difficult time pricing accu-
rately for an unknown damage or harm. 1 6 To avoid charging
too much or too little, regulation by the FAA may be the insur-
ance industry's preferred method to determine the risk associ-
ated with this activity. 117
Finally, the FAA is a specialized agency that has the purpose
of maintaining the safety of the public airspace."' With the
FAA's expert aviation knowledge, the agency can create rules
better tailored to model aircraft than a generalistjudge can for
a case that needs to be decided relatively quickly." 9 More spe-
cific rules can lead to better compliance with rules, which could
lead to greater avoidance of harm. 21
2. Costs of the FAA's Interpretation
While safety benefits exist, many costs result from an extensive
regulation. Primarily, innovation is hindered along with the re-
sults that innovation brings to the public. The FAA's interpreta-
tion prevents many experimental technologies that, with market
forces, could lead to safer innovations and arguably safer activi-
ties that could prevent more harm than regulation could. For
example, due to a lack of regulation, model aircraft today can
"follow GPS waypoints, land autonomously or return to a pre-
113 See Elaine D. Solomon, Part One: Unmanned Aircraft Systems ("UAS")-AKA
Drones Usages and Regulation: Where Are We Headed?, BLANK ROME LLP (June 2014),
http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentlD=37&itemlD=3330.
114 See Elaine D. Solomon, Part Three: Unmanned Aircraft Systems ("UAS") -AKA
Drones Insurance Issues: Where Are We Headed?, BLANK ROME LLP (June 2014),
http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentD=37&itemID=3343.
115 See Pirker Brief, supra note 10.
116 See Solomon, Part Three, supra note 114.
117 See id.
11s See FAA Origins, supra note 5.




determined point if the connection with a controller is lost."'12 1
Model aircraft are also being used in new and innovative ways to
promote public safety, such as using a UAS to investigate a burn-
ing building before firemen enter.122 If FAA regulation intends
to match a fast-paced, innovative system, high costs will be in-
curred because the regulation probably cannot take into ac-
count every innovation of model aircraft. 12 1
The FAA is also using unnecessary resources to create overlap-
ping regulation, especially considering the harm's low fre-
quency. Common law causes of action, such as nuisance,
trespass, and negligence, are regulatory schemes currently in
place. Since the costs for more regulation are very high, the
market may be more cost-effective at controlling itself, such as
organizations like the AMA creating self-regulating standards for
the model aircraft community. Considering that only two deaths
have occurred in the past 100 years, costs may be lower if few
cases are taken to court rather than extensive regulation being
passed. While the judges are generalists, an absence of FAA reg-
ulation enables the model aircraft community to be self-regu-
lated and to create specialized rules for themselves to follow. But
as Posner points out, the court standards cannot prevent cases
of severe wide-scale harm, such as the Great Recession.124 While
the use of model aircraft has been increasing rapidly and is pro-
jected to continue, 125 the probability of a large-scale disaster is
unknown at this time, but it still could occur.
If model aircraft are to be incorporated in the FAA regulatory
scheme, more costs will be incurred to create specific standards
for model aircraft. For example, some model aircraft would not
meet any current FAA regulation since they cannot fly over 500
feet, which is the base altitude for any aircraft under FAA regula-
tion. 126 Since this is such an innovative industry, the FAA will
likely have to incur future costs in rewriting the rules or adding
121 Dave Cawley, Many Concerned About Invasion of Privacy with Personal Drones,
KSL (Sept. 26, 2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?sid=27013640.
122 See Petition for Review, UAS America Fund v. FAA, No. 14-1156, 2014 WL
4407995 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 2014).
123 See Posner, supra note 65, at 18 (noting that a major disadvantage of regula-
tion is that it can "exclude from consideration factors the significance of which
was not realized when a rule was promulgated.").
124 See id. at 17.
125 See Hagemann & Thierer, supra note 34, at 2 (stating that the UAS industry
is projected to add $82.1 billion to the national economy between 2015 and
2025).
126 See Pirker Brief, supra note 10, at 18.
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further amendments and interpretations to the definition of
model aircraft. 127 Therefore, the FAA will incur present and fu-
ture costs in creating a regulatory framework for model aircraft.
3. Weighing the Costs and Benefits
Thus, a judge will consider whether the FAA regulation is
worth the additional cost, when the probability and gravity of
the harm may not seem that great. As seen from current model
aircraft innovations, greater public safety has been achieved
through innovation.1 28 On the other hand, innovation is proba-
bly hampered by regulation at the expense of the public gaining
a greater likelihood of safety. Even with the increased usage of
model aircraft, there has been little harm caused by this indus-
try, which would not justify impeding a growing innovation.
Moreover, given the model aircraft community's ability to self-
regulate, the government would inefficiently spend resources to
regulate an industry when the government could use the re-
sources to regulate a more harmful industry. Given the little
harm created thus far from model aircraft, the cost of judicial
decisions would probably not outweigh the time, money, and
effort spent in creating detailed regulations that would effec-
tively cover an evolving industry. Also, any resources spent may
be doubling over any practices that the model aircraft commu-
nity already has in place, such as the use of an additional ob-
server when using FPV.1 21 Other considerations than mentioned
here may be present, but if these are the only considerations,
the FAA's interpretation would be nullified because the greatest
wealth maximization and safety for society in this situation is
achieved by allowing innovation and self-regulation.
127 For example, the requirement for human watching the aircraft in the pro-
posed interpretation is due to the recent development of using First-Person View,
or goggles, to watch the aircraft fly at ranges up to ten miles from the operator.
See Glenn Derene, Flying Unmanned Aircraft in the Face of Authority, PoPuLAR
MECHANICS (Mar. 7, 2014, 7:32 PM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/tech-
nology/aviation/diy-flying/flying-UAVs-in-the-face-of-authority-15441157.
128 See Cawley, supra note 121.
129 See RCAPA Rebuttal to the FAA's Interpretation of the Special Rule for





In contrast to Posner, Ronald Dworkin argues that principles
should be the basis of ajudicial decision, not policies. 130 Accord-
ing to Dworkin, a policy is a "standard that sets out a goal to be
reached," such as an economic, political, or social improve-
ment."' On the other hand, Dworkin says principles are a con-
cept of morality, such as justice or fairness, and are not observed
solely because they will advance an economic, political, or social
aim accepted by society.'1 2 By focusing only on policy, the judge
destroys the concepts of fixed rights and entitlement, which
must be looked at in difficult cases.1 33
In controversial cases, the rules may not be able to extend to
the case, and thus the judge will use principles to determine the
rights of the parties.13 4 Dworkin believes judges should attempt
"to find the best justification they can find, in principles of polit-
ical morality, for the structure as a whole, from the most
profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the details
of, for example, the private law of tort or contract. ' 13 Thus, a
judge must find the principles that justify practices of society
and past precedent.13 6 Since competing principles may be
found, the judge then chooses the interpretation that is "'sub-
stantively' better, that is, which promotes the political ideals he
thinks correct.""1 7 Once the "substantively better" principle is
found, it can then be applied to the existing law.'3 8 This two-step
process, of finding the justifying principles and then choosing
the "substantively better" principle, will be applied to the case at
hand to determine the outcome if a judge uses Dworkin's con-
structivist theory.
A. JUSTIFYING PRINCIPLES
From the narrow details of model aircraft history to the entire
constitutional structure, ajudge will have many principles to dis-
130 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1093 (1975).
13, Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 23 (1967).
132 See id.
133 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 130, at 1091-93.
134 See id. at 1093.
135 Ronald Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 165, 165 (1982)
(emphasis omitted).
136 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 130, at 1091.
137 Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, supra note 135, at 171.
138 See id.
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cern in making a decision whether the FAA should regulate
model aircraft.
1. Narrow Principles
Looking first to the narrow details of model aircraft's history,
the FAA's prior history of no regulation of the model aircraft
industry indicates a principle of not regulating model aircraft.
This lack of regulation was shown from the FAA's insistence on
choosing not to regulate the model aircraft industry in a formal
opinion. 1 9 Moreover, a principle of no government regulation
is also derived from the ability of community-based organiza-
tions, such as the AMA, to self-regulate the model aircraft indus-
try and adopt regulations for model aircraft users. 140 However,
despite the long history of lack of regulation, there is also a re-
cent history of the FAA attempting to regulate model aircraft,
such as the definition within the FAA Modernization Act.'41 Fur-
thermore, in 2014, many rulings have been issued about model
aircraft, such as preventing their use in the national park sys-
tem 14 2 and allowing their use on movie sets. 143 Given the differ-
ences in these rulings' results, no clear principles can be drawn
from recent events of whether there is a principle of not regulat-
ing model aircraft.
2. Broad Principles
In addition to the narrow view of the model aircraft industry,
Dworkin also says that the judge should look at broad principles
from the government as a whole. 144 First, there is a principle of
favoring innovation. The best example has been the govern-
ment's decision not to regulate the Internet to spur innova-
tion. 45 By letting the Internet previously operate without
139 See Pirker Brief, supra note 10.
140 See Press Release, Acad. of Model Aeronautics, AMA Files Petition for Re-
view of FAA's Interpretive Rule (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.modelaircraft.org/
files/AMAFilesPetitionforReviewofFAAsInterpretiveRule.pdf.
141 See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336,
126 Stat. 11, 77-78.
142 See Hughes, supra note 38.
143 See Press Release, FAA, U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx Announces FAA
Exemptions for Commercial UAS Movie and TV Production (Sept. 25, 2014)
http://www.faa.gov/news/press-releases/
newsstory.cfm?cid=TW251&newsld=17194.
144 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 130, at 1084-85.
145 See Hagemann & Thierer, supra note 34, at 3. However, there has been a
recent debate over whether the Internet should be regulated, which stems from
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regulatory interference, the government indirectly supported
the Internet in becoming a successful innovation. 14 6
There is a second applicable principle of the government pro-
tecting the public's general safety. Within the airline industry
specifically, the FAA was created to regulate the safety of an in-
novative industry.14 7 Throughout history, there have been many
other government agencies and programs that were created to
protect Americans' safety. An evolving example has been the
creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
which was originally created in the aftermath of the Great De-
pression. 148 The SEC was created to protect the general public
from the investing abuse that led to the Great Depression and to
encourage public trust in investments.'49 The main statutes Con-
gress created to protect the investing public were the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934.150 However, the
SEC's regulation has not remained stagnant, but rather has
evolved to keep pace with changes in technology and the crea-
tion of new financial instruments.1 51 Another example of a fed-
eral agency being created after wide-scale harm is the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).152 The EPA was cre-
ated in 1970 after growing awareness of harmful waste, such as
throw-away packaging, sewage, and industrial chemicals, that
were deteriorating the environmental landscape of America.' 53
Moreover, like the SEC, the EPA's regulations have continually
unfairness that has resulted from internet providers providing priority access to
certain websites who pay fees for this priority. See Marguerite Reardon, Net Neu-
trality Debate Part I: How We Got Here, CNET (May 25, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www
.cnet.com/news/the-net-neutrality-debate-part-i-how-we-got-here/. The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) recently decided to regulate the internet to
allow for the internet to remain open and free for use. See Bill Chappell, FCC
Approves Net Neutrality Rules for 'Open Internet, NPR (Feb. 26, 2015, 11:46 AM),
http: //www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2015/02/26/389259382/net-neutrality-
up-for-vote-today-by-fcc-board.
146 See Hagemann & Thierer, supra note 34, at 3.
147 See FAA Origins, supra note 5.
148 See MARc I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION I (6th ed. 2013).
149 See id. at 5.
150 See id. at 1.
151 See id. at 2-3. Most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act was passed to better pre-
vent the corporate misconduct that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, and
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 to combat many of the innovative
frauds at companies such as Enron and WorldCom. See id.
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evolved to keep up with changes in technology.'-" This history of
the SEC and FAA, along with other government agencies, shows
a principle of the government using agencies to protect the pub-
lic safety and evolving the agency's regulation to keep up with
changes in technology. However, the history of both the SEC
and FAA also display a principle of the government not regulat-
ing until a large harm has occurred.'5 5 This shows a reactive
principle of not regulating an industry based on speculative
harm, but issuing regulations after harm has actually oc-
curred. 156 While there may be some instances of protecting spec-
ulative harm, these examples show the government does not
waste resources on protecting harm until the harm actually
occurs.
1 57
Third, there are principles of personal privacy resulting from
cases of aircraft equipped with cameras.1 58 On one hand, the
Supreme Court has allowed the police to conduct surveillance
from manned aircraft and the pictures taken did not amount to
a search. 59 In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court stated
154 See id.
155 See FAA Origins, supra note 5; see also STEINBERG, supra note 148, at 1-3 (not-
ing that the SEC was not created until after the Great Depression). Moreover, the
two recent large congressional statutes regulating the securities market, Sarbanes-
Oxley and Dodd-Frank, both were created after large-scale harm in the financial
market occurred. See STEINBERG, supra note 148, at 1-3.
156 "Regulatory policy generally seeks to prevent harm before it occurs, but the
reality is that it usually has been more reactive than precautionary, responding
only after harm has become manifest." Robert V. Percival, Risk, Uncertainty and
Precaution: Lessons from the History of US Environmental Law, in TRADE, HEALTH AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: THE EUROPEAN UNION PUT TO THE TEST 25, 25 (Marjolein
B.A. van Asselt et al. eds, 2014), http://ssm.com/abstract=2365518.
157 See Chappell, supra note 145 (noting that after a longstanding policy of not
regulating the internet, the FCC voted to regulate the internet after harm from
broadband providers occurred). While not present in the Net Neutrality deci-
sion, the FCC has adopted a proactive approach to regulating the telecommuni-
cation monopolies. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory
Strategy, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 42 (2003). Additionally, although a foreign exam-
ple, the European Economic and Social Committee published an opinion decid-
ing to take a proactive law approach, as opposed to its traditional reactive
approach. See generally Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on "The
Proactive Law Approach: A Further Step Towards Better Regulation at EU Level", 2009
OJ. (C 175) 26.
158 See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986)
(noting the Environmental Protection Agency did not conduct an illegal search
by taking aerial photos of a Dow Chemical plant as part of an environmental
investigation).
159 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1986) (holding that the
police's surveillance of the defendant's backyard and discovery of marijuana
plants did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment).
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that "[t]he Fourth Amendment simply does not require the po-
lice traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a
warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye."16
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Florida v. Riley made a simi-
lar ruling, but noted that while the police were flying above 400
feet, which is within the airspace regulated by the FAA, a differ-
ent ruling would have been reached if the police were flying
below that level. 161 These Supreme Court rulings show no viola-
tions of personal privacy by police from the air, but as stated in
Riley, different results may be had if the aircraft were flown at
low altitudes. 6 2 Thus, a principle can be derived that police
searches from aircraft are valid at a certain altitude, but under
that altitude, privacy issues can be violated. Since model aircraft
do not have the capabilities to be flown at the FAA's current
regulated altitude, model aircraft would logically have a high
probability of violating privacy rights if used by police for
surveillance.
In summary, there are three broad principles that are applica-
ble in this case: preference of favoring innovation, protection of
general public safety through a government agency after large
scale harm, and violation of personal privacy from surveillance
of aircraft flown below the FAA regulated airspace.
B. CHOOSING THE "SUBSTANTIVELY BEST" PRINCIPLE
Following the next step in constructivism, the substantively
best principle is chosen to decide whether the FAA should regu-
late model aircraft.'63 After looking at the foregoing narrow and
broad principles, the substantively best principle is that the gov-
ernment should not regulate an innovative industry until large-
scale harm has occurred. Given the lack of regulatory history,
this decision would be most consistent with past precedent, or
lack thereof. The low amount of harm in the past was probably
due to little use, and with increased use of model aircraft, the
probability of harm may stay the same but with increased magni-
tude. However, as with the examples of the Internet, along with
the financial and environmental industries, the government has
a history of not initiating protection of public safety until wide-
160 Id. at 215.
161 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989).
162 See id.
163 Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, supra note 135, at 171.
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scale harm has occurred. 64 In this case, no large amount of seri-
ous harm has yet to occur, which indicates that model aircraft
should not be regulated. 165 While personal privacy may be vio-
lated, these are solely speculations that personal privacy may be
violated using model aircraft. 166 If privacy issues were the main
justification for regulating model aircraft, then the greater safety
measures that could be achieved through innovation would be
lost, which contradicts the FAA's purpose.1 67 The government
does not indicate a history of protecting speculated harm, but
rather harm that does in fact occur. Establishing a precedent of
heavily regulating an industry that has only produced minor
harm could result in justifications in the future for broad gov-
ernment interference with innovation. While harm from privacy
issues may occur, air safety is still promoted by the continuance
of innovation, which furthers the FAA's purpose of air safety.' 68
Thus, until wide-scale harm occurs, model aircraft should not be
regulated.69
V. THE PREFERRED THEORY FOR MODEL AIRCRAFT
As shown from the foregoing, both theories will likely reach
the same result. However, these two theories of jurisprudence
are very different. Thus, one theory may be realistically better
for future decisions regarding the regulation of model aircraft
and for spurring the innovation of the model aircraft industry.
Posner's theory of pragmatism has positive and negative as-
pects. A decision using this theory would reach the most eco-
nomic decision, without regard to infringement on ideals such
164 See, e.g., Chappell, supra note 145.
165 See Lowry, supra note 9.
166 See Wells C. Bennett, Civilian Drones, Privacy, and the Federal-State Balance,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Sept. 2014), http://ivw.brookings.edu/research/re-
ports2/2014/09/civilian-drones-and-privacy#ftn2. "It would be hard to design a
preemptive, national-level policy without knowing more about what sorts of
drones will fly, what sorts of privacy rules will survive a first round of legal review,
and so forth." Id. at 14.
167 "The FAA's mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system
in the world and does not include regulating privacy." Unmanned Aircraft Sys-
tem Test Site Program, No. FAA-2013-0061 (proposed Feb. 22, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. pt. 92), http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/UAS-privacy-require
ments.pdf.
168 See id.
169 Since model aircraft are a subset of UAS products as a whole, most of the
arguments in this paper could probably be applied to show the degree to which
the FAA should integrate the entire UAS industry.
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as privacy and fairness. 170 Additionally, a judge would be able to
easily take into account changes in technology because the
judge is not tied down by past precedent, which was applied to
older technology. Moreover, a pragmatic decision could better
meet society's current goals or social aims. For instance, by using
a pragmatic approach, the judge can take into account the deci-
sion's economic effect on technology companies' goals of using
the emerging model aircraft technology. 171 However, the most
economic decisions can be disliked by the public for being un-
fair. For example, during the Sydney hostage crisis in December
2014, the taxi company Uber's objective pricing algorithm calcu-
lated taxi fares of four times the normal rate because of the
highly increased demand to leave downtown Sydney during the
turmoil caused by actions from the Islamic State. 172 The public
perceived this pricing surge as maliciously taking advantage of
people, and Uber received much criticism for this perceived un-
fairness. 173 With a constant supply, a pure economic decision
would increase price as demand increases, which is what Uber
did, but this economic decision is not always the best in the pub-
lic's eye. 1 7 1 Moreover, future decisions on similar cases may dif-
fer because of the judge's perspective, which could result in a
lack of consistent decisions. This article was influenced by the
author's perspective, which may differ from a judge's view and
result in a different outcome than reached in this article. For
example, the judge may have a political party bias or may favor
government regulation over, the freedom of innovation. 175 Fur-
thermore, biases and heuristics could wrongly influence the
judge's economic analysis. For example, if more negative or pos-
itive news is released about model aircraft before a decision is
made, the judge may incorrectly put more weight on the recent
news, resulting in an availability bias.1 76 Additionally, the judge
170 See Cantu, supra note 61, at 77.
171 See Hagemann & Thierer, supra note 34, at 2.
172 See Issie Lapowsky, What Uber's Sydney Surge Pricing Debacle Says About Its Public
Image, WIRED MAG. (Dec. 15, 2014, 12:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/12/
uber-surge-sydney/.
173 See id.
174 See id.; see also Reem Heakal, Economic Basics: Supply and Demand, INVES-
TOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/economics/economics3.asp
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (stating that "as consumers have to compete with one
other to buy the good at this price, the demand will push the price up").
175 See Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (And Against "Nonsense"Jurisprudence),
100 GEO. L.J. 865, 874 (2012).
176 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 129 (2011). Daniel
Kahneman, the 2002 Nobel Prize winner in Economic Sciences, defines the avail-
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may be more inclined to place more weight on loss from harm
than on gains from innovation, even if both are of equal
degree.177
Dworkin's constructivism also has good and bad aspects. On
the positive side, a judge using constructivism would create a
rule that is most consistent with past decisions, which can show
fairness to society because of consistency in rule-making. This
approach can allow for consistent decisions over a period of
multiple cases and keeps in line with reasoning that has been
developed over many years. This consistency can provide cer-
tainty, which leads to better observance of a rule. 78 On the
other hand, constructivism is less likely to take into account
changes in technology, which may warrant a need for regulation
when past precedent is based on older, less used technology.
Along these lines, this approach's result would likely follow the
FAA's purpose of air safety, which may lead to ignoring society's
new goals and social aims with model aircraft. Additionally, not
to the same degree as pragmatism, constructivism depends in
part on the personality of the judge, particularly the judge's view
of morality. This may lead to error in a single decision, but over
a long period, would lead to more consistent results.
In the author's view, Dworkin's constructivism is the best the-
ory of jurisprudence in this case because of its advantages of
consistency and predictability. Looking at the two theories from
an economic perspective, the consistency and predictability of
constructivism would likely result in greater innovation of model
aircraft, which would likely lead to a safer model aircraft indus-
try. For an innovative technology to develop, consistency in reg-
ulation or lack of regulation is important for making a
technology that the inventor knows conforms to the rule. Under
the pragmatic approach, a judge may change his mind on the
ability heuristic as "the process of judging frequency by 'the ease with which in-
stances come to mind.' . . . You wish to estimate the size of a category or the
frequency of an event, but you report an impression of the ease with which in-
stances come to mind. Substitution of questions inevitably produces systematic
errors." Id. Among others, additional cognitive biases affecting people, including
judges, are focusing on existing evidence and ignoring absent evidence,
overweighting low probabilities, and responding more strongly to losses than to
gains. See id.
177 See id. at 308-09. This concept is defined as "loss aversion." See id. Regarding
loss aversion in the law, Kahneman explained that in legal decisions about com-
mercial transactions, assuming both amounts are equal in dollar amount, we are
more likely to restore losses than compensate for foregone gains. See id.
178 See Posner, supra note 65, at 14.
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subject and prevent certain types of model aircraft from flying.
If an aircraft was suddenly prohibited, the developers would suf-
fer severe setbacks on their inventions by unexpectedly not be-
ing able to operate the aircraft. Along with consistency, there is
greater predictability that results from constructivism, which
again can result in greater innovation when the developers
know the constraints that are imposed when creating the inven-
tions. While large scale harm may occur before any regulation,
the government can wait to see if regulating model aircraft is
necessary without wasting costs on an industry that may never
cause harm or that may create its own safety measures through
innovation.
VI. CONCLUSION
As shown from the foregoing, model aircraft is an innovative
industry that does not need to be regulated. Through Posner's
economical approach and Dworkin's evaluation of past prece-
dent and constitutional principles, both theories of jurispru-
dence show model aircraft should not be regulated by the FAA
and that air safety can best be achieved by allowing innovation
to continue. Posner's view takes into account the judicial deci-
sion's effect, but ignores precedent and notions of morality. An
analysis under this economical form of jurisprudence would
probably determine that the government wastes resources in
regulating an industry that does not pose harm to society and
that has already created its own set of self-regulating practices.
Dworkin's approach is more structured and less flexible but pro-
motes consistency and fairness by adhering to previous deci-
sions. An analysis under Dworkin's jurisprudence would
determine that the government has a history of not regulating
an industry until wide-scale harm has happened and that inno-
vation, which could lead to safer practices than regulation could
create, should be favored until society is harmed. Given the
need for the environment of an innovation to be reliable in or-
der to thrive, Dworkin's jurisprudence would be the best reason-
ing because it promotes a predictable environment that would
allow for the most innovation for model aircraft. Therefore, the
FAA would create the safest environment for model aircraft by
allowing continued innovation in the industry, and the pro-
posed interpretation of the special rule should be nullified.
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